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Polish Jurisprudence in a Crooked Mirror 
(a polemic with Tomasz Bekrycht and Rafał Mańko*)
1. Introduction. By ‘jurisprudence’, Tomasz Bekrycht and Rafał Mańko 
(the ‘Authors’)1 mean legal theory and philosophy of law. Surprisingly, pursuant 
to the Authors, the period between 2000 and 2019, which they discuss extensive-
ly, belongs to the 20th century. The main part of the article relates to the period 
after 1990 and mentions almost exclusively books and articles published after 
2000. In fact, the Authors give an extremely brief overview of the hundred years 
between 1900 and 2000 and deal with the first twenty years of the 21st century in 
a much more comprehensive manner. 
Our claim is that this paper provides an inadequate, unbalanced, and rath-
er skewed picture of Polish legal theory and philosophy of law. As a historical 
paper, it is obviously inaccurate, and as an overview, it does not serve its func-
tion very well. However, let us start with several general remarks.
Writing an overview of a discipline is not an easy task. Obviously, no au-
thor is able to give a full and detailed account. Authors have no choice but make 
a selection, as neither all scholars working in the discipline and all published 
papers and books can be included nor all topics covered. Such a selection can-
not be fully objectivized, and a degree of discretion by the authors is unavoid-
able. However, there are also limits of such discretion. First, an overview must 
be balanced. The authors should accept that a certain approach or theory should 
not preclude them from devoting appropriate space in the overview to rival ap-
proaches or theories. Second, an overview should refer to papers and books 
which are representative of a given approach or theory and not to publications 
selected at random. Third, an overview must be unbiased, with authors refrain-
* T. Bekrycht, R. Mańko, Polish Jurisprudence in the 20th Century: A General Over-
view, Review of Central and East European Law 2020, vol. 45 (the ‘Overview’).
1 The paper is available in open access on the journal website: https://brill.com/view/
journals/rela/45/2-3/article-p181_181.xml (accessed 18 Nov. 2020). The Review of Cen-
tral and East European Law (RCEEL) refused to publish our critical reply to this paper 
for reasons that remain not entirely clear.
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ing from attaching excessive weight to the publications of their personal friends 
and collaborators. They must be very careful when referring to their own pub-
lications (we admit, however, that sometimes such a reference may be neces-
sary). Fourth, if an overview is addressed to foreign readers, the authors should 
refer to publications which are accessible to foreign readers and, in particular, 
are written in English or any other international language (of course, it may not 
always be possible). We will argue below that none of these limits has been ob-
served by the Authors.
In addition, an overview should be informative. A mere listing of people, 
topics and publications does not benefit the readers much. It is quite obvious for 
the reader that that this requirement has not been satisfied by the Overview. 
One more remark: we deliberately chose not to refer to our own papers or 
books, as self-promotion is not our purpose. Rather, we aim to supplement the 
deficient description and the related misleading narrative by pointing to missing 
significant figures and sources, as seen from the perspective of an average read-
er of Polish legal theory. There is obviously much more that can be mentioned on 
any topic we – and the Authors – deal with. However, our aim is merely to pro-
vide a substantial supplement.
2. Is the Overview balanced? It is particularly difficult to discuss the part 
of the article which refers to the period between 1900 and 1990. The Authors de-
vote just five pages (section 2) to this period, with few footnotes. Only two foot-
notes refer to original works of legal philosophers active in the last years of this 
period, namely Jerzy Wróblewski and Maciej Zieliński; all other footnotes men-
tion only selected works of secondary importance, mostly ones published after 
2000. We do not think that a foreign reader will benefit much from this. By way 
of example, we will refer to only one topic – normativism. Although in section 
3 the Authors do mention one article by Kazimierz Opałek, they fail to mention 
other important critical accounts of normativism authored in the pre-war period 
by Jerzy Lande2 and Czesław Martyniak3. With respect to the after-war period, 
they mention neither the fundamental book by Jerzy Wróblewski4 nor important 
works of Kazmierz Opałek5; as far as more recent period is concerned, they ig-
nore important books and papers by Monika Zalewska6 and Tomasz Widłak7. 
2 J. Lande, Norma a zjawisko prawne. Rozważania nad podstawami teorii prawa na 
tle krytyki systemu Kelsena [Norm and Legal Phenomoenon. Investigations of the Fun-
daments of the Legal Theory from the Perspective of the Critique of Kelsen’s System], 
Czasopismo Prawne i Ekonomiczne 1925, vol. 50, p 60–71.
3 C.  Martyniak, Moc obowiązująca prawa a teoria Kelsena [Validity of Law and 
Kelsen’s Theory], Lublin 1938.
4 J. Wróblewski, Krytyka normatywistycznej teorii prawa Hansa Kelsena [Critique of 
the Normativist Theory of Law of Hans Kelsen], Warszawa 1955.
5 K.  Opałek, Überlegungen zu Hans Kelsens “Allgemeine Theorie der Normen“, 
Schriftenreihe des Hans Kelsen–Insituts 2980, vol. 4.
6 M. Zalewska, Problem zarachowania w normatywizmie Hansa Kelsena [The Prob-
lem of Imputation in Hans Kelsen’s Normativism], Łódź 2018. 
7 T.  Widłak, Teoria i filozofia prawa międzynarodowego Hansa Kelsena [Hans 
Kelsen’s Theory and Philosophy of International Law], Gdańsk 2018. 
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We will now concentrate on section 4.2 of the Overview, titled ‘New cur-
rents after 1989’. We begin, however, with the last paragraph of section 4.1, 
where the authors state: ‘[t]he traditional approach of Polish analytical jurispru-
dence has been continued after 1989, especially in the Poznań-Szczecin school 
and at the Marie Curie-Skłodowska University in Lublin. However, individual 
representatives of traditional analytical legal theory continue to be active in all 
Polish universities.’ This statement is not just surprising, it is shocking. Leaving 
aside for the moment the vagueness of the term ‘analytical legal theory’ and the 
Authors’ strict association of analytical legal theory with the word ‘traditional’, 
let us note that currently in Kraków, there are five tenured professors (by a ‘pro-
fessor’, we mean a scholar with Habilitation) plus a number of scholars with 
a PhD degree, who, under the vague criteria adopted by the Authors, certain-
ly work exclusively on analytical legal theory (and a few others who also work 
on other issues).8 In Katowice, there are three professors, and in Warsaw, there 
are at least two; at both universities, there are also a number of younger schol-
ars who work on similar matters. The statement that they all are ‘individual [i.e. 
‘isolated’ – authors’ note] representatives’ is obviously false because all the au-
thors we have referred to, as well as many others who were not mentioned, do 
take part in discussions at both the intra-national and supra-national levels. 
However, a far more important thing is the Authors’ understanding of 
‘analytical approach’. Footnote 8 suggests that they believe that ‘both analytical 
jurisprudence and Kelsenian normativism gave the impression that law is a phe-
nomenon which can be grasped in an objective, neutral and “scientific manner”’. 
That may be true of some versions of normativism and of analytical jurispru-
dence prior to the publication of The Concept of Law by Herbert L.A. Hart, but 
it certainly is not true of contemporary analytical jurisprudence on the global 
scale, even leaving aside the question of its vague boundaries. Obviously, ana-
lytical jurisprudence, defined as a methodologically ‘analytical’ approach to law, 
does not suggest that law can be thoroughly and objectively grasped. Rather, 
what can be grasped through ‘analytical’ methods is most often only a partial 
meaning or a shared understanding of certain concepts in certain contexts. Most 
analytic legal philosophers do not harbour any more serious metaphysical ambi-
tions. In particular, they do not wish to provide the necessary and sufficient cri-
teria for the concept-term application (in the way the classical analysts from Ox-
ford school had suggested). Nonetheless, they believe that careful and organized 
scrutiny of the way officials and legislators use legal terms is a means to eluci-
date their meaning, or that certain expressions of legislative intention or judicial 
opinion should be systematically paraphrased.9 
8 Also in Kraków there is an independent research centre called Jagiellonian Centre 
for Law, Language and Philosophy, a place of cooperation between analytic philosophers 
and legal scholars. The Centre cooperates with analytic legal scholars from major Euro-
pean universities (Paris, Milan, Zagreb, Surrey, to name but a few). In this case it is par-
ticularly misleading to describe the scholars cooperating in this context merely as [pre-
sumably ‘isolated’ – authors’ note] ‘individuals’.
9 It would also be unfair to describe all analytically-oriented legal scholars working 
in recent years at Polish universities as interested in ‘traditional, analytic legal theo-
ry’, as the Authors do. Some young Polish scholars engage in international discussions 
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The entire section 4.2 (pages 188–199, representing approximately two-
thirds of the whole paper) is based on the assumption that all ‘new currents’ 
worth mentioning are non-analytical or that they even oppose analytical legal 
theory. The Authors are not quite consistent, as in sub-section 4.2.3, they brief-
ly describe the theory of interpretation developed by Ryszard Sarkowicz. This 
quite innovative theory belongs, without a doubt, to the analytical stream. 
We strongly disagree with the assumption that scholars whom the Authors 
tacitly count as part of the analytical tradition (and whom they therefore fail to 
mention at all) do not represent any ‘new currents’. Let us provide a few exam-
ples. In providing these examples, we will accept the Authors’ bizarre conven-
tion according to which the first two decades of the 21st century still belong to 
the 20th century. The examples are as follows:
The novel theory of interpretation developed by Marcin Matczak, found in 
his two books and a number of papers, published mostly in high-ranking interna-
tional journals. His theory is based on Milikan’s evolutionary theory and biose-
mantics as well as Kripke-Putnam semantics.10 
Important works on the legal interpretation by scholars from Katowice 
(Zygmunt Tobor, Agnieszka Bielska-Brodziak, and Mateusz Zeifert), based on 
empirical research and cognitive linguistics.11
 Innovative empirical research on the understanding of legal texts with 
the application of sophisticated psychological methods conducted by Marcin Ro-
manowicz.12 
Pioneering works on constitutional interpretation authored inter alia by 
Tomasz Stawecki, Jan Winczorek, Marek Smolak, and Sławomira Wronkowska.13
regarding relatively new methods of analysis of the concept of law, like the Canberra-
style analysis (P. Banaś, F. Gołba, Canberra‐Style Analysis and Law: A Critique of Andrei 
Marmor’s Farewell to Conceptual Analysis, Ratio Juris: An International Journal of Ju-
risprudence and Philosophy of Law 2017, vol. 4(30), p 549–559)
10 M. Matczak, Summa iniuria. O błędzie formalizmu w stosowaniu prawa [Summa 
Iniuria. On the Fallacy of Formalism in Application of Law], Warszawa 2007; M. Matc-
zak, Imperium tekstu [Text Empire], Warszawa, 2019; M. Matczak, Three Kinds of Inten-
tion in Lawmaking, Law and Philosophy 2017, vol. 36, p 651–674.
11 Z. Tobor, W poszukiwaniu intencji prawodawcy [In Search of the Lawgiver’s In-
tention], Warszawa 2013; A. Bielska-Brodziak, Śladami prawodawcy faktycznego: ma-
teriały legislacyjne jako narzędzie wykładni prawa [Following the Real Legislator; 
Legislative Materials as a Tool of Interpretation of Law], Warszawa 2017; M. Zeifert, 
Gramatyka przepisu jako przesłanka decyzji interpretacyjnej [The Grammar of a Le-
gal Provision as Grounds for Interpretative Decision], Katowice 2019, plus a number of 
their papers published in English.
12 Inter alia, M. Romanowicz, Cognitive Efficiency within the Context of Legal Expert 
Knowledge. The Eye-tracking Study on the Polish Legal Notaries, Law and Forensic Sci-
ence 2015, vol. 9.
13 T.  Stawecki, J.  Winczorek (eds.), Wykładnia Konstytucji. Inspiracje, teorie, ar-
gumenty [Interpretation of the Constitution. Inspirations. Theories and Arguments], 
Warszawa 2017; T. Stawecki, Autonomous Constitutional Interpretation, 4(25) Interna-
tional Journal for the Semiotics of Law 2012, p 505–535; S. Wronkowska, O niektórych 
osobliwościach konstytucji i jej interpretacji [On Certain Peculiarities of the Constitu-
tion and its Interpretation], [in:] M. Smolak (ed.), Wykładnia konstytucji. Aktualne prob-
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A novel account of purposive interpretation developed by Marek Smo-
lak14 and an important book on extensive interpretation authored by Krzysztof 
Płeszka15.
Application of the Gricean and post-Gricean concepts of conversional im-
plicatures to legal interpretation in a book by Izabela Skoczeń.16
Olgierd Bogucki’s innovative works on the so-called functional interpreta-
tion of law.17
Agnieszka Choduń’s series of books and papers on the language of law in 
the context of interpretation.18
The above examples (the list is by no means exhaustive) refer only to the 
theory of legal interpretation. Let us quote a few more examples of innovative 
approaches from other fields: 
(i) The theory of validity developed by Andrzej Grabowski in his opus 
magnum, as well as his innovative papers on post-positivism; Andrzej Grabows-
ki also translated from Spanish into English a forgotten paper by Herbert 
L.A. Hart, which was published in the Oxford Journal of Legal Studies with his 
comments.19
(ii) Development of the theory of legislation in the works by (inter alia) 
Sławomira Wronkowska, Mikołaj Hermann, Piotr Zwierzykowski, and Krzysztof 
Płeszka.20
(iii) Works on institutional facts and constitutive rules authored inter alia 
by Stanisław Czepita and Marek Smolak.21
lemy i tendencje [Constitutional Interpretation. Current Problems and Trends], Warsza-
wa 2016.
14 M. Smolak, Wykładnia celowościowa z perspektywy pragmatycznej [Purposive In-
terpretation from the Pragmatic Perspective], Warszawa 2012. 
15 K. Płeszka, Wykładnia rozszerzająca [Extensive Interpretation], Warszawa 2010.
16 I. Skoczeń, Implicatures within Legal Language, Springer 2019.
17 O.  Bogucki, Model wykładni funkcjonalnej w derywacyjnej koncepcji wykładni 
prawa [Model of Functional Interpreration in the Derivational Conception of Legal In-
terpretation], Szczecin 2016. 
18 Inter alia A. Choduń, Aspekty językowe derywacyjnej koncepcji wykładni prawa 
[Linguistic Aspects of the Derivational Conception of Legal Interpreration], Szczecin 2018.
19 A. Grabowski, Juristic Concept of the Validity of Statutory Law. A Critique of Con-
temporary Legal Nonpositivism. Springer 2013; A. Grabowski, The Missing Link in the 
Hart–Dworkin Debate, Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 2016, vol. 36(3), p 476–481.
20 To give just a few examples: M. Hermann, S. Wronkowska, Intertemporal Issues in 
Constitutional Law: Basic Considerations, [in:] J. Mikołajewicz, W. Szafrański, A. Godek 
(eds.), The Intertemporal Problems – Polish Legal Perspective, Poznań 2017, p 9–47; 
P. Zwierzykowski, Nowelizacja jako sposób zmiany prawa [Novelization as a Method 
of Changing the Law], Poznań 2016; M. Araszkiewicz, K. Płeszka (eds.), Logic in the 
Theory and Practice of Lawmaking, Springer 2016.
21 S.  Czepita Reguły konstytutywne a zagadnienia prawoznawstwa [Constitutive 
Rules as a Problem of Jurisprudence], Szczecin 1996; M. Smolak, Prawo, fakt, instytucja 
[Law, Fact, Institution], Poznań 2018. 
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(iv) A series of books authored by Wojciech Patryas on, inter alia, legal 
presumptions and performatives in law.22
(v) Fundamental analysis of legal principles in the books by Marzena 
Kordela and Sławomir Tkacz along with a number of articles on this topic au-
thored by others23. 
(vi) Works on legal argumentation authored inter alia by Jerzy Stelmach, 
Bartosz Brożek, Andrzej Grabowski and Michał Araszkiewicz (mostly published 
in English)24, as well as numerous papers on artificial intelligence and law pub-
lished by Michał Araszkiewicz25.
(vii) Important works on the role of precedent in continental legal systems 
authored inter alia by Leszek Leszczynski and Marek Zirk-Sadowski.26
(viii) Application of Brandom’s analytic pragmatism to legal philosophy in 
numerous papers authored by Maciej Dybowski.27
(ix) Maciej Kłodawski’s innovative works on redundancy in legal texts.28
The two sets of examples given above refer only to works which the Au-
thors of the Overview would probably classify as the ‘analytical approach’. We 
strongly believe that these examples demonstrate that the analytical approach 
can also be innovative. However, the Authors fail to mention many important 
non-analytical contributions. Let us thus list the most important omissions of the 
Authors. These include:
22 W. Patryas, Próba wyjaśnienia domniemań prawnych [An Attempt at Explanation 
of Legal Presumptions], Poznań 2011; W. Patryas, Performatywy w prawie [Performa-
tives in Law], Poznań 2005.
23 M. Kordela, Zasady prawa. Studium teoretycznoprawne [Legal Principles. A The-
oretical Study], Poznań 2012; S. Tkacz, O zintegrowanej koncepcji zasad prawa w pol-
skim prawoznawstwie (Od dogmatyki do teorii) [On the Integrated Conception of Legal 
Principles in Polish Jurisprudence (From Dogmatics to Theory)], Toruń 2016.
24 J. Stelmach, B. Brożek, Methods of Legal Reasoning, Springer 2006; Bartosz Brożek 
Defeasibility of Legal Reasoning, Kraków 2004; J. Stelmach, B. Brożek, Rationality and 
Discourse. Towards a Normative Model of Applying Law, Warszawa 2007; A. Grabowski, 
Judicial Argumentation and Pragmatics: A Study on the Extension of the Theory of Le-
gal Argumentation, Kraków 1999; M. Araszkiewicz, J. Savelka, Two Methods for Repre-
senting Judicial Reasoning in the Framework of Coherence as Constraint Satisfaction, 
in: Legal Knowledge and Information Systems. JURIX: The Twenty-Fourth Annual Con-
ference, K. Atkinson (ed.), Frontiers in Artificial Intelligence and Applications, vol. 235, 
Amsterdam 2011, p 165–166, as well as numerous other articles written by him. 
25 Inter alia, M. Araszkiewicz, Towards Systematic Research on Statutory Interpreta-
tion in AI and Law, Kevin Ashley (ed.), Frontiers in Artificial Intelligence and Applica-
tions, vol. 259, Amsterdam, 2014, p 15–24.
26 L. Leszczyński, J. McClellan Marshall, Precedens w procesie orzekania. Perspek-
tywa sędziowska w ujęciu porównawczym [Precedent in Adjudication. The Compara-
tive Judicial Perspective], Lublin 2019; L. Morawski, M. Zirk-Sadowski, Precedent in 
Poland, [in:] N. MacCormick, R. S. Summers, A. L. Goodhart (eds.), Interpreting Prece-
dents, Routledge 1997, p 219–258.
27 See, inter alia, M. Dybowski, Teoria prawa wobec wyzwań pragmatyzmu anali-
tycznego [Legal Theory Facing the Challenges of Analytical Pragmatism], Archiwum 
Filozofii Prawa i Filozofii Społecznej 2017, vol. 1, p 17–33.
28 M.  Kłodawski, Redundancja w tekście prawnym [Redundancy in Legal Text], 
Toruń 2017.
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(i) Numerous important books by Jerzy Zajadło and his team in Gdańsk, 
relating mostly to the fundamental ethical problems of law, including Rad-
bruch’s formula, the problem of Mauerschützenprozesse, and the problem of hu-
manitarian interventions.29 
(ii) Wojciech Załuski’s important books, in which a conception of law 
based on the theory of evolution is developed.30
(iii) Although the Authors mention ‘legal cognitivism’ briefly (probably 
having in mind cognitive science), they fail to take note of several important 
books by Bartosz Brożek, published mostly in English, including his last book 
published by a top-ranking international publishing house.31
(iv) Several important works of Grażyna Skąpska, published mostly in 
English, relating to the socio-theoretical aspects of transformation in East and 
Central Europe.32
(v) Important publications of Andrzej Bator, Zbigniew Pulka, and 
Włodzimierz Gromski on, inter alia, instrumentalization of law and post-analyti-
cal legal theory.33
(vi) Jolanta Jabłońska-Bonca’s important book on legal myths.34
Moreover, the Authors mention none of the numerous publications on the 
topic of human rights. They also seem to believe that Christian legal philosophy 
has ceased to exist, as they ignore publications of scholars from Catholic Univer-
sity in Lublin. 
The above list of important ‘new currents’ that the Authors fail to mention 
in their Overview is certainly not exhaustive. Many others should be added. 
We can envisage two types of arguments the Authors may use in their de-
fence. First, they may argue that the assessment of which works represent ‘new 
29 J. Zajadło, Formuła Radbrucha. Filozofia prawa na granicy pozytywizmu prawni-
czego i prawa natury [Radbruch’s Formula. Legal Philosophy on the Border of Legal 
Positivism and Natural Law], Gdańsk 2001; J. Zajadło, Odpowiedzialność za mur: pro-
cesy strzelców przy Murze Berlińskim [Responsibility for the Wall. Mauerschützenproz-
esse], Gdańsk 2003; J. Zajadło, Judges and Slaves, Gdańsk 2019; S. Sykuna, J. Zajadło, 
The Theory of Hard Cases and Humantarian Intervention, Polish Review of Internation-
al and European Law 2012, vol. 1.
30 W.  Załuski, Evolutionary Theory and Legal Philosophy, Edward Elgar, London 
2009; W. Załuski, Law and Evil. The Evolutionary Perspective, London 2018.
31 B. Brożek, The Legal Mind. A New Introduction to Legal Epistemology, Cambridge 
2019; B. Brożek, Rule-Following. From Imitation to the Normative Mind, Kraków 2012.
32 Inter alia, G. Skąpska From Civil Society to Europe: A Sociological Study of Consti-
tutionalism after Communism, Leiden–Boston 2012.
33 A. Bator, Postanalityczna teoria i filozofia prawa: nowe szanse, nowe zagrożenia? 
[Post-Analytical Theory and Philosophy of Law: New Chances, New Threats?], Przegląd 
Prawa i Administracji 2015, vol. 102, p 21–44; M.  Anderson, J.  Anderson, A.  Bator, 
Analytical Theories of Law: Negation or Adaptation, [in:] A. Bator, Z. Pulka (eds.), Le-
gal Theory and Philosophy of Law: Towards Contemporary Challenges, Warsaw 2013, 
p 115–134; Z. Pulka, Struktura poznania filozoficznego w prawoznawstwie [The Struc-
ture of Philosophical Cognition in Jurisprudence], Wrocław 2004; W. Gromski, Autono-
mia i instrumentalny charakter prawa [Autonomy and Instrumental Character of Law], 
Wrocław 2000.
34 J. Jabłońska-Bonca, Prawo w kręgu mitów [Law in the Circle of Myths], Gdańsk 
1995.
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currents’ and which are interesting is a matter of taste, and therefore, any de-
cision in this respect is discretionary. De gustibus not disputandum est. That is 
certainly true. If they, however, use this argument, we would be forced to say 
that their taste is quite bad, even if only non-analytical works are concerned. 
They would have to admit, for example, that Sławomir Oliwniak’s papers refer-
ring to the works of Giorgio Agamben (fn. 42) are more important than the evo-
lutionary theory of law developed by Wojciech Załuski in two books published by 
a top international publishing house. They would have to admit that two papers 
on Stanley Fish’s theory of interpretation authored by Jakub Łakomy (fn. 36) 
are more important than the book by Bartosz Brożek published by Cambridge 
University Press. They would also have to admit that two papers authored by 
Bronisław Sitek on the professional ethics of a certain narrow category of state 
officials are more important than a profound study of Radbruch’s formula by 
Jerzy Zajadło. We could provide many more examples, however, that would 
bore the readers. Quite frankly, any successful argument of this kind would de-
mand a careful comparison of the juxtaposed works, with the result that the pre-
sumption that the best world publishing houses are associated with good quality 
would be breached. Such a result is unlikely.
The second defence might be along the lines of ‘we are sorry, but the lim-
ited space did not allow us to include X or Y.’ Of course, the length of each paper 
is limited. We do not wish to say that the authors should have included all the 
topics listed above. Our point is that they should have included at least some of 
them. It seems to us, however, that the Authors did not even try to economize on 
space. Let us give several examples. The Authors decided to provide an almost 
complete list of Tomasz Bekrycht’s publications on phenomenology (one book 
and four articles in fn. 63). The Authors decided to devote a half-page to an, oth-
erwise very interesting, theory of Artur Kozak (section 4.2.6), although the same 
volume of the RCEEL contains a comprehensive description of this theory by 
Rafał Mańko. Would a cross-reference in footnote 50 not suffice? Furthermore, 
the Authors could have economized on the space by reducing the number of ref-
erences to their own publications: Tomasz Bekrycht has five and Rafał Mańko 
has eight (plus two references to collective volumes co-edited by him), or even 
by substantially reducing references to some other scholars: Adam Sulikowski 
– thirteen publications plus two references to collective volumes edited by him; 
Hanna Dębska –  five; and Sławomir Oliwniak –  six. That would make section 
4.2.4 (in which footnotes occupy more space than the text itself) more transpar-
ent and would give them the opportunity to include other scholars. 
There is, however, one very peculiar merit in all of this, as writing about 
one’s own works rarely results in a distortion of the author’s views. However, re-
gretfully, in the case of the Overview, this practice is rather counterproductive 
considering the purpose of the whole enterprise.
3. Is the Overview representative? As underlined in the Introduction, the 
Overview should refer to papers and books which are representative of a given 
approach or theory, not to publications selected at random. We do not think that 
this quite obvious requirement has been satisfied. Let us substantiate this claim 
with some examples. 
PAŃSTWO i PRAWO  1/2021 127
In this short list, we deliberately omitted a wide range of more interdisci-
plinary works, such as works related to problems of law and justice as seen from 
the perspective of political philosophy.
4. Naturalistic currents. We think there is considerable confusion in this 
section (4.2.1.). First, there is a general methodological problem of naturaliza-
tion of legal science. Many important publications on this general topic exist. In 
footnote 20 the Authors mention only one collective volume and fail to note that 
the possibility and scope of naturalization is a highly controversial issue. There 
are many other important contributions to this general problem authored in-
ter alia by Jerzy Stelmach, Bartosz Brożek, Wojciech Załuski, and Tomasz Pie-
trzykowski.35 But these works deal d with a meta-problem: the possibility and 
scope of naturalization. Second, there are many possible directions and routes 
of naturalization. The Authors are probably right in saying that Law & Econom-
ics is one of those routes. In footnotes 18 and 20, they refer to two important con-
tributions (a book by Mariusz Golecki and a book by Jerzy Stelmach, Bartosz 
Brożek, and Wojciech Załuski). Two other articles are mentioned, but both are 
purely descriptive and do not bring any new ideas. They fail to mention the im-
portant book authored by Wojciech Załuski.36 They could also have mentioned 
certain important publications of Katarzyna Metelska-Szaniawska and Piotr 
Bystranowski, relating to specific issues in this field.37 Another important route 
of naturalization relates to the application of cognitive science and neuropsy-
chology. Here the books authored by Bartosz Brożek should be mentioned.38 Fur-
ther, the application of evolution theory to law is without a doubt a major contri-
bution to naturalization. We have in mind here two books and numerous papers 
authored by Wojciech Załuski.39 
The entire subsection 4.2.1 ‘Naturalistic currents’ is regrettably only 12 
lines long. In our opinion (although we personally do not work in this field), Pol-
ish works relating to the application of cognitive science, neuropsychology, and 
evolution theory constitute the most innovative, original and productive contri-
butions of Polish legal theory to the global discussion and as such they definitely 
deserve more attention in any overview. 
5. Legal ethics. This short subsection (9 lines plus footnotes) is surprising, 
to say the least. First, the Authors seem to confuse legal ethics with the profes-
sional ethics of various legal professions. They only mention two other problems, 
35 See, for example, T. Pietrzykowski, Naturalizm i granice nauk prawnych: esej z 
metodologii prawoznawstwa [Naturalism and the Borders of Legal Sciences: Essay in 
the Methodology of Jurisprudence], Warszawa 2017.
36 W. Załuski, Game Theory in Jurisprudence, Kraków 2013.
37 K. Metelska-Szaniawska, Economic Effects of Post-Socialist Constitutions 25 Years 
from the Outset of Transition. The Constitutional Political Economy Approach, Frank-
furt 2016; P. Bystranowski, Ekonomiczna analiza prawa wobec problemu optymalnej 
precyzji dyrektyw prawnych [Economic Analysis of Law in View of the Problem of Opti-
mum Precision of Legal Directives], Państwo i Prawo 2016, no 5, p 18–33.
38 See fn. 32.
39 See fn. 31.
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namely, the legal status of animals and the ethics of interpretation. Let us start 
by stating that the four scholars mentioned in this subsection belong to the top 
league: Paweł Skuczyński, Przemysław Kaczmarek and Marcin Pieniążek (with 
respect to professional ethics) and Tomasz Pietrzykowski (with respect to cer-
tain other issues). What surprises us is that footnote 29 lists two relatively unim-
portant papers on the rights of animals, while failing to mention the important 
book and articles authored by Tomasz Pietrzykowski, who profoundly analyses 
the legal status of non-human subjects.40 Tomasz Pietrzykowski is an interna-
tionally-recognized expert in animal rights. 
Mentioning animal rights as practically the only topic besides professional 
ethics in this subsection is clearly misleading. The Authors fail to note numer-
ous publications relating to bioethics and law, which is, in our opinion, the most 
important problem within broadly understood legal ethics. Here, we would first 
consider the works authored by Marta Soniewicka devoted to genetic selection 
and other bioethical problems relating to law.41 Moreover, the authors fail to note 
numerous works by Polish authors relating to the ethical and legal problems of 
abortion, euthanasia, and in vitro fertilization,42 among others.The Authors ap-
pear to think that the problem of justice is irrelevant for legal philosophy, as they 
do not mention even one publication related to this topic.43 They also fail to take 
note of important publications on the problems related to the ethical and philo-
sophical aspects of humanitarian interventions.44
Generally, the Authors’ claim that legal ethics encompasses only profes-
sional ethics plus animal rights is simply false.
40 T. Pietrzykowski, Personhood beyond Humanism: Animals, Chimeras, Autonomous 
Agents and the Law, Springer 2018.
41 M. Soniewicka, Selekcja genetyczna w prokreacji medycznie wspomaganej. Etycz-
ne i prawne kryteria [Genetic Selection in Medically Assisted Procreation. Ethical and 
Legal Criteria], Warszawa 2018; M. Soniewicka, W. Lewandowski, Human Genetic Se-
lection and Enhancement. Parental Perspectives and Law, Berlin 2019
42 See, for example, J. Malczewski, Eutanazja: Gdy etyka zderza się z prawem [Eu-
thanasia: When Ethics and Law Collide], Warszawa 2012; W. Ciszewski, T. Żuradzki, 
Conscientious refusal of abortion in emergency life-threatening circumstances and con-
tested judgments of conscience, American Journal of Bioethics 2018, vol. 18(7), p 62–64; 
W. Ciszewski, Rozum publiczny w praktyce: kwestia legitymacji moralnej wniosku gru-
py posłów o stwierdzenie niekonstytucyjności przesłanki aborcyjnej [Public Reason in 
Practice: The Moral Legitimacy of the Constitutional Complaint Lodged by Polish MPs 
Challenging the Constitutionality of the Abortion Law], Ruch Prawniczy, Ekonomiczny 
i Socjologiczny 2018, no 3, p 17–31; M. Klinowski, Zarodki, komórki macierzyste i na-
tura ludzka [Embryos, Stem Cells, and Human Nature], Diametros 2009, no 5, p 55–65; 
M. Klinowski, O niemoralności aborcji: koherencja przekonań, biologiczne człowieczeń-
stwo i słuszne interesy [On the Immorality of Abortion: The Coherence of Convictions, 
Biological Humanity, and Just Interest], Diametros 2008, no 16, p 10–40. 
43 See, for example, M. Soniewicka, Granice sprawiedliwości, sprawiedliwość ponad 
granicam [The Borders of Justice, Justice beyond Borders], Warszawa 2010; W. Załuski, 
The Limits of Naturalism: A Game-Theoretic Critique of Justice as Mutual Advantage, 
Kraków 2006.
44 See fn. 29. 
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6. Philosophy of interpretation. The Authors say that legal hermeneu-
tics has been developed especially by Jerzy Stelmach, Henryk Leszczyna, and 
Marek Zirk-Sadowski. This is undoubtedly true with respect to Jerzy Stelmach 
and Marek Zirk-Sadowski. If the Authors, however, had read the book by Hen-
ryk Leszczyna, they would certainly not claim that it was an important contribu-
tion to hermeneutics. They also fail to note other Polish contributions, published 
mainly in international journals.
7. Transitional justice. The Authors fail to mention Michał Krotoszyński’s 
important book and papers.45 
8. Is the Overview unbiased? Subsection 4.2.4 (Postmodern and critical 
currents) comprises 5 pages, which is one-third of the whole Overview (exclud-
ing the abstract and conclusions). As far as the period after 1990 is concerned, 
this section constitutes more than half of the Overview. We would like to stress 
that, in our opinion, Critical Legal Studies and certain other streams linked to 
CLS, such as feminist jurisprudence and critical race jurisprudence (for the 
sake of simplicity, we will refer to all them as ‘CLS’) are very important parts of 
contemporary jurisprudence. By no means, however, can CLS be considered to 
be the dominant part (and certainly not in Poland). By devoting so much space to 
CLS, the Authors seem to suggest that CLS is a sort of key approach in Polish le-
gal theory, which is simply false and misleads foreign readers. If the Authors are 
so fascinated with CLS and want to focus on the development of CLS in Poland, 
they should have written another paper describing the achievements of CLS. 
The above leads us to the conclusion that the Overview is biased, as it is 
driven by the personal engagement of one of the Authors in CLS.
9. Do the Authors refer to publications accessible to foreign readers? A for-
eign reader, after having read the Overview, may come to the conclusion that 
Polish jurisprudence is a purely local and isolated enterprise. Books and papers 
published in English are rarely referred to in the footnotes. Among more than 
100 publications mentioned in the footnotes, only 24 are English publications of 
Polish scholars working in Poland. Only 10 out of these 24 publications in Eng-
lish were issued abroad, and only a handful of them in reputable journals and 
publishing houses. 
This may create an impression of the parochiality of Polish jurisprudence, 
which impression would be false. Starting from approximately 1970, more and 
more articles by Polish authors have been appearing in internationally recog-
nized journals (in the initial phase, in German, English and French, and in the 
last 30 years, unfortunately, almost exclusively in English, which has become the 
lingua franca of legal philosophy). In recent years, increasing numbers of books 
have appeared in top-ranking international publishing houses. We have men-
tioned some of them in the footnotes above. The Authors fail to recognize (pos-
sibly with the exception of the CLS movement) the active Polish involvement in 
45 M.  Krotoszyński, Modele sprawiedliwości tranzycyjnej [Models of Transitional 
Justice], Poznań 2017; M. Krotoszyński, Transitional Justice Models and Analytical Phi-
losophy: Towards Theory, Polish Political Science Yearbook 2017, vol. 2(46), p 9–21.
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the contemporary discussion on the philosophy of law. Out of the numerous con-
gresses, conferences and other international events organized in Poland, includ-
ing the World Congress of Legal and Social Philosophy in Kraków in 2007, they 
mention just one: CLS conference in Wrocław. 
As far as Polish publications are concerned, it is surprising that the Au-
thors refer quite frequently (especially in subsection 4.2.4) to papers published 
in journals edited by newly established private colleges without faculties of law. 
The same applies also to certain collective volumes mentioned by the Authors. 
We are afraid foreign readers will not be keen to follow publications in such 
journals. 
10. Conclusion. In our opinion, the Overview is misleading, unbalanced, 
unrepresentative, and strongly biased. It gives a false picture of Polish legal the-
ory and philosophy of law. The qualification made by the Authors that ‘the paper 
presents exclusively the personal views of the authors’ (p. 199) is not a sufficient 
excuse. The Authors are free to promote solely their own personal views. How-
ever, if they do so, the title of their paper should instead read: ‘What We Like in 
Polish Jurisprudence in the last 30 years’ or perhaps ‘Polish Jurisprudence in 
the Last 30 Years: Us, Our Friends, and a Few Insignificant Others’. 
Polska teorii i filozofii prawa w krzywym zwierciadle
Artykuł zawiera krytykę obrazu dwudziestowiecznej teorii i filozofii 
prawa, jaki przedstawili Tomasz Bekrycht i Rafał Mańko w artykule pt. Po lish 
Jurisprudence in the 20th Century: A General Overview, opublikowanym na 
łamach Review of Central and East European Law (2020, nr 45). Argumentu-
jemy, że wskazany artykuł nie jest niewyważony i stronniczy, w związku z czym 
przedstawia nietrafny obraz polskiej teorii i filozofii prawa. 
Słowa kluczowe: prawoznawstwo, Polska, interpretacja prawnicza, meto-
dologia prawoznawstwa, analityczna teoria prawa
Keywords: jurisprudence, Poland, legal interpretation, methodology of ju-
risprudence, analytical legal theory
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